Drone technology introduced multiple new challenges in regard to security, warfare as well as industry. Policy-makers, military strategists and industrialists in NATO countries are trying to figure out how to cut innovation cycles, keep industry innovating and producing at scale while also keeping stocks – for deterrence as well as any potential war. This brief will explore two potential solutions of this conundrum: utilization of the Drone-as-a-Service (DaaS) and Counter-Drone-as-a-Service (C-DaaS) concepts for national militaries and the use of Software-Defined-Drones (SDDs).
Especially in light of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, accelerating innovation cycles while simultaneously maintaining industrial scale (at least available to scale up rapidly), robust deterrent stocks, and overall adaptability becomes one of the most critical conundrums and paradoxes in modern warfare. Old ways will not work – standard procurement models cannot keep pace with drone electronic warfare (EW) and software optimization cycles, which fluctuate in as little as 2 to 6 weeks.
DaaS is increasingly used in the private sphere as a business model where enterprises outsource and pay for certain capability – for instance processed (aerial) data or delivery of some product or tool. This can be used in various sectors such as agriculture or logistics. The benefits are clear: companies and organizations are supplied with a tailored service/product without having to purchase and maintain their own fleets of drones, trained pilots, and other connected technologies. Providers deliver expertise, equipment, pilots, and processed data (or other final product) and handle all necessary approvals.
Rapidly rising importance of defensive, i.e., counter-drone technologies and systems opens discussion on C-DaaS.
For any private entity that seeks to increase its productivity, effectiveness, expand, or realizes that in 2026 and beyond it should take its counter-drone defence seriously (e.g., critical infrastructure operators or defence manufacturers), these concepts become a go-to option. But can it work in the military?
Deterrence in peace, strike capability in war
NATO and its member states are not at war. They are, however, neither at peace. Multitude of authors and works have tried to describe the current state of international (security) order: fragmented, collapsing, in between formal peace and informal constant conflict.
Recent developments in regard to drone warfare on the front in Ukraine but also, to some extent, in the Middle East, suggest that NATO member states should adapt, otherwise they clearly risk their (cap)abilities to defend themselves and wage a modern conflict – should it come – will not be sufficient and/or adequate. Achieving mass deployment of key military technology such as drones without stranding obsolete assets becomes critical.
However, any lessons learned from Ukraine (or Iran, to some extent) need to reflect the basic fact: Ukraine is at full-scale war. Their cycles, processes and modes of operation are grounded in this reality. Pressure to deliver is incomparably greater under such circumstances than while being at peace.
NATO countries, on the other hand, face various other, often conflicting pressures. To deliver military capabilities and capacities needed for modern warfare in current socio-economic context can sometimes resemble a Herculean task. And even if enough financial resources are available (and, indeed, efficiently absorbed), how do you deliver drones in required quantity and quality in due time that would serve as a deterrent, but also should be used – and useful – in any potential conflict in the future?
Governments sit on (relatively) tight budgets. Armies require adequate technology. Companies often lack enough capital to innovate and deliver without longer-term contracts. And in between, the innovation cycles are getting shorter and shorter.
Is (C-)DaaS the answer?
It could be. It could be part of a hybrid procurement mechanism.
Under such mechanism, first-person view (FPV) and kamikaze and/or loitering drones (so-called expendables, i.e., high-attrition, single-use munitions) would be procured through standard process as they practically cannot operate on a service subscription – yes, these need to be acquired in desired quantities in order to project deterrence (as part of nation’s strike capabilities), and then once the conflict escalates into war. Also, of course, in case the asset’s availability cannot or will not be ensured by the provider, or when contractor is lacking trust, such examples would not be good options for a military outsourcing.
However, for capabilities such as intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), routine tasks (e.g., cargo delivery), and for training, the DaaS can serve as a mutually-beneficial mode of functioning for NATO militaries.
C-DaaS can provide an integrated, modular and flexible detection, tracking, identification and mitigation canopy, avoiding prolonged and complicated process of procuring, integrating, layering and updating multiple expensive C-UAS technologies (radars, radio-frequency and other sensors, jamming tech, lasers, interceptors, etc.) by the national MODs and militaries. At the same time, it also poses a question of strategic dependence and outsourcing control to private companies in vital area of national security and defence.
Software-Defined Drones
If (C-)DaaS poses risks of losing control and heightening dependencies and vulnerabilities in such sensitive areas, there is a potential game-changer that could turn such outsourcing into unnecessary risk. The coming of continuously upgradeable Software-Defined-Drones (SDDs).
The future of unmanned aviation can, to some extent, mirror the evolution of Software-Defined-Vehicles (SDVs). In principle, just like with cars, the hardware (airframe) becomes merely a physical wrapper while the real capability of drone is defined by its software. With over-the-air (OTA) updates, the drone becomes constantly upgradeable during its lifecycle. It can concern both offensive and defensive capabilities. When an adversary shifts electronic jamming frequencies or introduces new spoofing wavelengths, drones could receive (cyber)secure, encrypted OTA updates at the tactical edge to instantly reconfigure software-defined radios and signal processing filters. If an EW environment becomes completely denied, an OTA patch could push updated machine learning models. This shifts the fleet from GPS/remote-pilot reliance to fully autonomous, edge-computed optical target recognition.
However, just like with SDVs, software-enabled capabilities introduce new risks, vulnerabilities and attack vectors. Cybersecurity becomes absolutely critical, but even when achieving high resilience, vulnerable access points can never be completely eradicated. For example, a compromised OTA deployment pipe could allow an adversary (individual rogue hacker, terrorist or a coordinated state actor) to brick or hijack an SDD or indeed an entire drone fleet remotely. Also, sensitive data can be stolen.
What to do?
This brief explored the concepts of DaaS and C-DaaS and SDDs as potential solutions to a specific conundrum of a modern warfare: accelerating innovation cycles while simultaneously maintaining industrial scale, robust deterrent stocks (for both offensive and defensive purposes), and overall quick adaptability.
While outsourcing drone or counter-drone capabilities has certain benefits (no depreciation of assets, higher flexibility, integrated logistics), it also poses risks (supply chain security risks, higher dependency on third (private) parties, potential data leaks). Therefore, DaaS makes sense for the national militaries in certain areas (so-called reusable drones, ISR, training, logistics) and not in others (so-called expendable drones). Increasing flexibility through outsourcing should especially be highlighted in regard to military training – also civilian training for those countries that want to increase overall societal readiness and resilience. Allowing individual units in the armed forces to “borrow” and test new technologies, be it in smaller quantities, is critical. It will help with preparedness and should also feed the innovation loop.
In regard to C-DaaS, it is important to realize that effective C-UAS includes creating a balance of power not dissimilar – in principle – to mutually assured destruction in nuclear warfare. NATO militaries should project continuous deterrence through effective C-UAS layered integrated defence paired with (long range) drone strike capabilities to return adversary’s strikes (following the strategy of not destroying just the arrows, but eliminating the archer and his supply and logistical chains). In other words, deterrence is achieved only when the defender possesses an equal or greater capacity to absorb and dish out (mass) drone strikes.
In terms of SDDs, they also bring benefits (continuous upgradability) while posing risks (remote control, data leaks). National militaries should therefore diversify their drone assets and include SDDs while maintaining an arsenal of cheaper, less complex drones. They should avoid stockpiling fully assembled, high-end drones. Instead, militaries could stockpile millions of raw “dumb” airframes and structural components and keep them stored alongside specialized, high-margin components (e.g., thermal optics, chips, sensors) in modular kits. Then, the latest software and specialized payloads can be integrated right before operational deployment, preserving manufacturing volume while neutralizing – or at least minimizing – technological obsolescence. Universal, open-architecture flight control systems should allow software OTA updates to patch electronic warfare resistance without altering physical airframes. Cybersecurity of drones should also become a top priority for governments and businesses alike as SDD-related risk also demands highly secure, decentralized, and localized cryptographic key infrastructures.
The author of this analysis is solely responsible for its content. Opinions provided here do not necessarily reflect opinions and positions of the Adapt Institute.