Russia’s new nuclear doctrine marks a significant shift in the country’s approach to nuclear deterrence and reflects a broader strategy of using nuclear threats to address geopolitical challenges. Although not yet formalised into an official document, Putin’s September 25, 2024, statement outlines key changes that significantly alter the parameters under which Russia would consider the use of nuclear weapons. These changes are largely shaped by the ongoing war in Ukraine, the growing involvement of Western countries in supporting Kyiv’s military efforts, and efforts to change the deterrence system.
One of the most significant adjustments is the inclusion of Belarus under the so-called Russian nuclear umbrella. Although Belarus has long been a strategic partner through its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the modified doctrine clearly states that any aggression against Belarus would be considered an attack on Russia itself. This formal inclusion reflects the deepening military cooperation between the two countries in which Russian tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed on Belarusian territory. This move not only strengthens the link between Russia and Belarus but also extends Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities closer to NATO’s borders, increasing the level of risk in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine.
Another significant shift is the change in the justification for the use of nuclear weapons. Previous Russian doctrine allowed nuclear strikes if the very existence of the state was threatened. In the updated version, this is replaced by a more ambiguous and extensive justification, stating that nuclear weapons may be used in response to a ‘critical threat to sovereignty’. This broadening of the criteria lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, increasing the likelihood that Russia could resort to nuclear strikes under less severe conditions than originally envisaged. By introducing such ambiguity, Russia is creating strategic uncertainty for its adversaries, in particular NATO members supporting Ukraine, in an attempt to prevent further military assistance to Kyiv.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the revised doctrine is its explicit targeting of third-party states that support conventional attacks on Russia. This provision expands the definition of an attack to include non-nuclear states that are supported by nuclear powers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In the context of Ukraine, this means that NATO countries providing military assistance could be considered complicit in an attack on Russia, even if they are not directly involved in the fighting. This increases the risk to the Alliance and underlines Moscow’s intention to discourage Western countries from continuing to support Ukraine’s defence efforts.
In addition to these changes, the new doctrine also introduces the concept of “air strike” as an argument justifying nuclear retaliation. This is particularly important given that drone warfare, ballistic missile attacks and the use of hypersonic weapons have come to the fore in the Ukrainian conflict. By expanding the definition of attack to include various forms of air and missile threats, Russia is further expanding the circumstances in which it can use nuclear weapons. This shift is consistent with Russia’s recent focus on countering NATO’s advanced military technologies and Ukraine’s growing capabilities.
However, the potential for Russian nuclear threats is not exclusively military in nature. It is also part of a broader strategy of coercion designed to divide NATO and weaken Western support for Ukraine. Since the invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia has repeatedly used nuclear rhetoric to influence the trajectory of the war. In the early stages, these threats may have delayed Western military support, but over time, they have failed to prevent NATO from providing Ukraine with increasingly sophisticated weapons. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership appears to believe that increasing the ambiguity and scope of nuclear threats could yield more favourable results by sowing discord within NATO, particularly over the supply of long-range weapons.
Putin’s announcement comes at a time when discussions are intensifying within NATO about the risks of escalation, particularly the possibility of Ukraine launching long-range strikes on Russian territory. In fact, the United States and the United Kingdom have already approved the use of weapons systems they supplied in such attacks. For this reason, Moscow is apparently banking on the fact that fragmentation of opinion within NATO structures, coupled with the threat of nuclear escalation, could lead not only to reduced support but also to restrictions on the use of long-range weapons against targets deep inside Russia, which could also slow the delivery of key military capabilities. Although NATO has remained largely united in its support for Ukraine, the threat of nuclear escalation could undermine this unity, especially if key European countries are reluctant to engage in actions that could trigger a nuclear response from Russia. For Moscow, the goal is clear- to deter NATO from further involvement in Ukraine while maintaining sufficient strategic ambiguity.
Despite the escalated nuclear rhetoric, Russia is unlikely to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the near future. Lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is primarily intended to create psychological pressure on NATO and Ukraine, not to signal an immediate intention to deploy such weapons.
In view of these developments, it is essential that the international community, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, maintain a clear and consistent approach to deterrence. The ambiguity of the new Russian doctrine must be prevented from weakening the resolve of the NATO states. The Alliance must continue to provide strong support to Ukraine while making it clear that any use of nuclear weapons will have serious and far-reaching consequences for Russia. This includes not only military retaliation but also diplomatic and economic isolation on a scale that Russia has never experienced before.
In addition, efforts should be made to engage with Russia’s partners, particularly China and India, and encourage them to take a more active role in curbing Moscow’s nuclear ambitions. These countries, which have significant economic and strategic ties with Russia, are well placed to put pressure on Moscow to engage in arms control dialogue and defuse the current tensions. Their involvement could be crucial in preventing further normalisation of nuclear threats and in ensuring that global security is not compromised by Moscow’s increasingly aggressive posture.