Over the past four years, the Sahel has experienced a wave of military coups, with army officers seizing power and pledging to restore security. From Mali’s Colonel Goita to Burkina’s Captain Traoré to Niger’s General Tiania, each has blamed civilian governments for failing to address the jihadist threat. Western and UN troops have been expelled, and Russia’s Wagner Group has been called in to assist. However, despite these measures, the security situation is worse than before. Islamist groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, active in the region, underscore the shortcomings of these juntas with their ongoing activities.
The military juntas came to power due to widespread dissatisfaction with the failures of civilian governments and their Western allies in combating Islamist insurgents. In particular, French policy in the Sahel has provoked significant local resentment. Following a coup in Mali in 2021, another occurred in Burkina Faso a year later, and finally, in 2023, the army seized power in Niger. Consequently, France, Germany, the US and the UN were forced to withdraw all their troops. By September 2024, the last US troops left Niger, vacating a military base in Agadez that had cost more than $100 million. These departures created a security vacuum that the juntas have tried to fill by collaborating with the Kremlin-linked Russian Wagner Group.
The Sahel‘s military regimes’ cooperation with the Wagner Group starkly contrasts the previous civilian governments‘ alliances with Paris. The French had far greater technical capabilities, which they often used to their own advantage without being willing to risk the lives of their soldiers significantly. At the same time, they placed great emphasis on the protection of civilian lives. In contrast, Russian mercenaries are much more flexible allies for the local juntas, providing immediate support – even if it involves brutal tactics that result in significantly higher civilian casualties.
The al-Qaeda-linked JNIM (Nusrat al-Islam) and the Islamic State in the Sahel are exploiting the security vacuum in the region. Both groups primarily control rural areas, where they gain economic and territorial advantages from the lack of state presence and the extreme poverty. There are mutual tensions between JNIM and IS Sahel over their conflicting ambitions for control of the Liptako-Gourma region – the epicentre of cross-border jihadism, spanning parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, along with adjacent areas. This rivalry further adds to the complexity of an already challenging situation.
The conflict between government forces and jihadists in the central Sahel is critically impacting civilian lives. According to a Human Rights Watch report, both sides commit widespread violations of international humanitarian law. More than 2,000 Burkinabe, about 1,500 Malian and 300 Nigerian civilians have lost their lives since January 2024 due to the fighting. Alarmingly, government troops and their allies have killed even more civilians in the name of combating jihadism than the jihadists themselves. Furthermore, the true scale of violence in the Sahel may be even greater, as local juntas systematically restrict access to information for both local and foreign media. The extreme impact of this conflict on the lives of ordinary people has resulted in massive displacement, with over 110,000 individuals fleeing to Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin.
To deepen their cooperation, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formed a confederation called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) on 6 July 2024. Its members are united by their opposition to the West, their cooperation with Russia, and their regional and international isolation. In January 2025, the AES states will officially leave ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. This departure may negatively affect the regional economy, restrict the free movement of people and goods, and thus create further security problems. The risk of smuggling is likely to increase, ultimately benefiting the armed groups that the juntas are combating. The JNIM, for example, reportedly earns millions of US dollars from drug and migrant smuggling.Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have chosen to practice ‘sovereignty politics’ without the involvement of Western armies. However, they currently lack the capacity to do so, which the alliance with Russia has so far failed to create. As a result, while in 2021, Islamists and rebels controlled around 40% of Mali and Burkina Faso, today, more than 60% of Burkina Faso and 50% of Mali’s territory remain outside government control. The death toll from the conflict has reached 11,200, tripling that of 2021. The military juntas, in cooperation with Russia, have indeed achieved some symbolic victories, but these have come at the cost of high civilian casualties and with questionable relevance to real stability. It is also questionable whether Moscow is capable of becoming a long-term partner of the AES or if this is merely a foreign policy strategy from which Russia is currently benefiting. For the European Union, on the other hand, an unstable Sahel will pose an increasing security threat.